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Financing  and  provision  of  long-term  care  is an  increasingly  important  concern  for many
middle-income  countries  experiencing  rapid  population  aging.  We  examine  three  countries
(South  Korea,  Japan,  and Germany)  that  use  social  insurance  to  ﬁnance  medical  care  and
have developed  long-term  care  insurance  (LTCI)  systems.  These  countries  have  adopted
different  approaches  to LTCI design  within  the  social  insurance  framework.  We  contrast
their ﬁnancing  systems  and  draw  lessons  regarding  revenue  generation,  beneﬁts  design,
and eligibility.  Based  on  this  review,  it seems  important  for middle-income  countries  to
start developing  LTCI  schemes  early,  before  aging  becomes  a signiﬁcant  problem  and sub-
stantial  revenues  are  needed.  Early  ﬁnancing  also  ensures  that  the  service  delivery  system
has time  to adapt  because  most  middle-income  countries  lack the  infrastructure  for pro-
viding long-term  care  services.  One  approach  is to start  with a limited  beneﬁt  package
and  strict  eligibility  rules  and  expanded  the program  as the  country  develops  sufﬁcient
experience  and  more  providers  became  available.  All  three  countries  use  some  form  of
cost-sharing  to discourage  service  overuse,  combined  with  subsidies  for  poor  populations
to  maintain  appropriate  access.  A major  policy  choice  is  between  cash  beneﬁts  or  direct  pro-
vision  of services  and  the  approach  will  have  a large  impact  on the workforce  participation  of
women.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Introduction
Because of declining fertility rates and increasing
ife expectancy, many middle-income countries are now
eginning to focus on how to ﬁnance and develop long-
erm care programs. For most middle-income countries,
his is a relatively new issue necessitated primarily by the
hanging demographics and an increasing willingness in
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some cultures to allow elders to be cared for outside of
the home. The provision of paid long-term care services
raises many issues, including: the responsibility of families
to provide services to older persons, the provision of insti-
tutional versus home care, the appropriate level of training
for care providers, and many other cultural, ﬁnancial and
delivery system issues.
In this paper, we focus primarily on one issue – options
for designing a ﬁnancing system for long-term care in
middle-income countries. We  examine the choices in three
high-income countries that use social health insurance to
ﬁnance medical care to guide this discussion. In this article,
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
1320 J.C. Rhee et al. / Health Policy 119 (2015) 1319–1329
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
0 0 0 
Korea Asia  Paciﬁc Eur ope  & Centra l Asia
Lan America & Carribean Middle East & N Africa
ulation,1 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 2 
Fig. 1. Population aged 65 years and above as a percentage of the total pop
Source: [3].
we focus on South Korea as an example of a rapidly aging
country that is currently experiencing the demographic
transition that many middle-income countries will soon
experience and has recently decided to provide publicly
ﬁnanced long-term care insurance. We  contrast the ﬁnan-
cing approach taken by South Korea with the approaches
taken by Germany and Japan. The objective of this compar-
ative policy analysis is to suggest alternative approaches
to ﬁnance long term care services in middle-income
countries. We  focus on countries that use social insur-
ance to ﬁnance their medical care systems because many
middle-income countries use social insurance to ﬁnance
their medical care systems and so will be familiar with this
ﬁnancing approach [1].
International trends
Fig. 1 shows the aging trends in several World Bank
regions of the world. Most high-income countries already
have an aging population and most have already developed
or are developing long-term care systems. Most middle-
income countries have some additional lead-time before
the demographic transition makes long-term care a press-
ing economic and social problem. By 2050, approximately
20 percent of the population will be 65 or older in the Asian
Paciﬁc, Latin America, Europe, and Central Asian regions.
The Middle East and North Africa regions will approach 15
percent elderly population by mid-century.
1.1. Demographic trends in South KoreaSouth Korea is an example of a country already in the
middle of the demographic transition. The population of
South Korea nearly doubled in the second half of the 20th
Table 1
Demographic indicators in S. Korea, 1960–2010.
1960 1970 1980 
Population, total (millions) 25.01 32.2 38.1 
Population growth rate, annual (%) 2.91 2.18 1.56 
Population aged 65 and over (% of total) 3.7 3.3 3.9 
Fertility rate (births per woman) 6.16 4.53 2.82 
Life  expectancy at birth, females (years) 55.5 65.6 70.0 
Life  expectancy at birth, males (years) 50.6 58.7 61.8 
Source: [3].2 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 5 0
 in Korea and developing countries in different world regions, 1960–2050.
century, from about 25.0 million in 1960 to over 47.0
million in 2000 (Table 1). The birth rate then slowed dra-
matically while at the same time life expectancy increased
rapidly. Between 2000 and 2010, the overall population
growth rate was only 0.5 percent per year; the population
is projected to peak in 2030 at 53.7 million and to decrease
thereafter. This trend is the result of sharply decreasing
total fertility rate, which in 2010 was  the lowest among
OECD countries at 1.2 births per woman, as well as the
increasing life expectancy, which went from 52.4 years in
1960 to 81.1 years in 2011 and is projected to grow to 86.0
years by 2040 [2].
These trends have caused a fundamental change in the
population pyramid in Korea (Fig. 2). Between 1960 and
1990, the proportion of people aged 65 and over increased
relatively slowly, from 3.7 percent to 5.0 percent. It is now
increasing much more rapidly – having reached 11.1 per-
cent in 2010. This trend is projected to accelerate, with
the latest population projections estimating a proportion
of 15.7 percent in 2020, 24.3 percent in 2030, and 34.3 per-
cent in 2050. Perhaps more important for long-term care
services is that the population aged 80 years and over is
estimated to increase from 2.0 percent in 2010 to about
15.0 percent in 2050 [3].
2. Creating long-term care insurance (LCTI) in
South KoreaDeciding on the appropriate LCTI approach can take
years involving many interrelated decisions. The discus-
sion of creating a LTCI system in South Korea began in
2000, when a task force was  created under the Ministry
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
42.9 47.0 49.4 51.4 52.2 51.1 48.1
0.99 0.84 0.46 0.3 0.0 −0.4 −1.0
5.0 7.3 11.1 15.5 23.4 32.3 37.4
1.57 1.47 1.23 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
75.5 79.6 84.1 86.5 88.6 90.5 92.2
67.3 72.3 77.2 79.8 81.9 83.4 85.5
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f Health and Welfare. The initial idea was to create a
ystem separate from the social health insurance scheme
ecause at the time the social insurance system was fac-
ng a signiﬁcant budget deﬁcit and was not considered a
ood platform for LTCI [4]. Speciﬁc options were discussed
n 2003 and 2004, and three pilot projects were carried
ut [5]. The LTCI system in Korea was implemented in July
008 using a social insurance framework as the ﬁnancing
or medical care using social insurance as it became more
iable in the intervening years and therefore less politically
roblematic.
Implementation of the long-term care insurance system
ecame an important political issue in Korea as the percent-
ge of the elderly population grew rapidly. The elderly were
 high-turnout political constituency with a concern about
ong-term care services. As a result, the Korean leadership
ad a strong political incentive to enact a LTCI scheme [6].
n a social level, the families of the aged also strongly sup-
orted a program that would provide relief from the care
iving burden and ensure higher inheritances from aged
arents [6]. The increase in women’s labor force participa-
ion and the concurrent erosion in the culture of ﬁlial piety
hereby children (usually, the eldest daughter-in-law) hadesponsibility for their elderly parents led to increasingly
ommon conﬂicts within families [4]. The introduction of
he insurance program is also thought to have signaled
 policy shift from a deep focus on economic growth to960, 1990, 2010, and 2030. Source: [3].
increased attention towards the welfare of the population
[7].
A challenge was  that the country’s long-term care
infrastructure at the time was  inadequate, with an insuf-
ﬁcient supply of long-term care hospitals and residential
facilities, as well as a shortage of trained professionals.
Moreover, in contrast to many other developed countries,
South Korea (and to a certain extent, Japan) did not already
have an extensive system of religious and non-proﬁt orga-
nizations available to meet the need for long term care
services [5]. Political leaders therefore agreed that the
ﬁnancing scheme would help stimulate the development
of infrastructure in anticipation of the sharply increasing
number of elderly that are likely to use long term care
services [6].
There was a consensus that the LTCI program could not
be implemented without adequate provider supply, so the
Government employed two main approaches to accelerate
supply growth. First, starting in 2005, funds were allocated
to build new home-care, community-based and institu-
tional facilities in remote areas, and to renovate existing
facilities [8]. Due to concerns that this approach would
constitute a major budgetary burden, the Government
strongly promoted private sector participation: it allowed
the entry of for-proﬁt providers on equal footing with
non-proﬁts, eliminated or relaxed legal requirements for
providers, and held brieﬁng sessions to explain procedures
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Table 2
Number of LTC providers in Korea, 2006-2009.
Year Institutional facilities In-home providers
2006 815 1045
2008 (June)a 1271 3630
2009 (May) 2016 12,935
and Level 4 is given to those with a score above 51, requir-Source: Korean Development Institute 2010.
a Start of the LTCI implementation.
for establishing new LTC service organizations [8]. As
a result of this approach, the number of institutional
facilities and in-home service provider organizations grew
dramatically between 2006 and 2009 (Table 2).
Post-implementation public opinion was quite positive,
with 74.9 percent of Korean elderly and their caregivers
reporting satisfaction with the new system in 2009. This
proportion increased to 86.9 percent in 2011, suggest-
ing widening acceptance of the program [9]. Caregivers
are even more pleased with the system, with 88.5 per-
cent reporting being satisﬁed, 92.7 percent reporting that
it increases opportunity and time for social activities and
92.0 percent that it decreases the care giving burden
[10]. Among beneﬁciaries, 78.3 percent reported that their
health status had improved as a result of the new system,
while 75.5 percent said that it had improved the care envi-
ronment [10].
2.1. LTC ﬁnancing in South Korea
Two types of ﬁnancing were considered in the debate
prior to the introduction of the LTCI scheme: tax-based sys-
tem and social insurance. The social insurance approach
was preferred in part because of the reluctance of the gov-
ernment to increase the tax rates and because of Korea’s
familiarity with a social insurance system for ﬁnancing
medical care [6]. Politically, the Ministry of Health and Wel-
fare (MOHW) also favored the idea of a system under its
ﬁrm control.
One important concern at the time was whether there
would be enough people voluntarily choosing to purchase
LTCI in order to create an adequate pool of enrollees. The
experience with the introduction of a voluntary national
pension scheme to the urban self-employed in 1998, when
a signiﬁcant proportion of the target population did not
join the system, suggested that a mandatory system was
necessary [11]. In terms of ﬁnancing streams, the govern-
ment agreed to mirror the existing arrangements for social
health insurance, funding the contribution for the poor and
(partially) for the self-employed from general taxes, while
also requiring co-payments to moderate demand [6].
The system has four ﬁnancing sources. First, contrib-
utions are collected from all participants to the National
Health Insurance system. For formally employed individ-
uals, a contribution rate is currently 0.38 percent of wages,
paid in equal parts by the employer and the employee (0.19
percent each). The contributions for LTCI and social health
insurance are collected together by the National Health
Insurance Service, but are administered separately [5]. The
contributions of the self-employed (including farmers) are
decided by composite scores reﬂecting the individual’s19 (2015) 1319–1329
income, property, and other assets. Second, the govern-
ment supplements the LCTI contributions with additional
funding from general taxes, which represents 20 percent
of anticipated contribution receipts [4]. Third, state and
local governments subsidize the full contribution for those
eligible for welfare beneﬁts (called the Basic Livelihood
Security Program, BLSP). They subsidize 50 percent of the
contribution for the second-poorest group of citizens, who
most often live in poverty but do not meet the strict
eligibility requirements for the BSLP, including income,
assets, and the availability of assistance by relatives [12].
Finally, coinsurance is set at 15 percent of costs for home
care services and 20 percent for institutional care services
[13]. Even though the poor are exempted from these co-
payments [14], high out-of-pocket expenses have raised
concerns about unaffordability of services, especially for
the near-poor. As a result, the Seoul Metropolitan Govern-
ment began subsidizing out-of-pocket expenses for LTCI
beneﬁts for the near-poor starting in July 2013 [15], and
other local and municipal governments are considering
similar subsidies.
2.2. Eligibility for LTC in South Korea
Under the Korean system, there are two  criteria for
determining long term care eligibility: being 65 or older
or being younger than 65 and suffering from a “geriatric
disease” such as Alzheimer’s. People fulﬁlling either one
of these criteria must apply to receive beneﬁts. The costs
for applying for long term care beneﬁts are covered by
the Insurance Service, with a 20 percent out-of-pocket
payment for general applicants and 10 percent out-of-
pocket payment for beneﬁciaries qualifying for medical
disabilities.
To qualify for beneﬁts, an NHIS staff member (e.g., a
social worker or a nurse) makes a home visit and assess
the applicant’s physical function, psycho-cognitive func-
tion, and needs for nursing and rehabilitation treatment.
The applicant’s ability to perform activities of daily living
(ADLs) is also assessed using a standardized form [16]. An
assessment committee composed of physicians, case man-
agers, and social security professionals (14 members in
total and a chairperson) assesses the person’s application.
The committee operates at the city, county, or municipal
level [16]. The qualiﬁcation is based on having difﬁculty
with ADLs for a period of at least 6 months (Fig. 3). Five
rating levels are assigned to applicants who qualify. The
determination is based on a score calculated by aggregating
their performance using a checklist involving 52 dimen-
sions of mental and physical status. Level 1 is given for a
score of 95–100, for those applicants who  require help in
all aspects of daily life. Level 2 is given for a score between
75 and 95 and designates those who  require help in most
areas of daily life. Level 3 is given for a score higher than
60 who  are judged to require help in some part of daily life,ing more limited help in activities of daily life. Applicants
with a score below 51 are not approved for receiving ben-
eﬁts unless they suffer from dementia, in which case they
are assigned to Level 5.
J.C. Rhee et al. / Health Policy 119 (2015) 1319–1329 1323
orea. So
2
t
a
b
l
p
p
(
K
a
l
b
d
i
s
h
m
t
w
f
t
a
s
2
o
p
a
t
a
a
a
d
t
c
i
a
i
n
dFig. 3. Process for determining beneﬁts eligibility in K
.3. Beneﬁts
There are four main categories of beneﬁts covered under
he Korean system: facility beneﬁts, in-home beneﬁts,
ssistive device beneﬁts, and special cash beneﬁts. Cash
eneﬁts are provided rarely – for example, when there is a
ack of providers in the beneﬁciary’s area. In 2013 the cash
ayment amounted to US $173 per month (calculated using
urchasing power parity). Unlike in some other countries
see Germany below), cash beneﬁts are discouraged in
orea because of concerns regarding potential familial
buse and the worry that informal caregivers will provide
ow-quality care. Home care services are also covered, with
eneﬁt limits ranging from US $1,015 to $1,318 per month
epending on eligibility level. Beneﬁt limits for allowed
nstitutional services range from US $1,298 to $1,824. The
ystem covers the purchase or lease of assistive devices that
elp beneﬁciaries with their ADLs. These devices include
obile toilets, walkers, and slip-resistant products (of ten
otal products approved for purchase) as well as manual
heelchairs and electric beds (of six products approved
or lease) [13]. These costs do not cover lodging (for institu-
ional care), food, haircuts and hairstyling, upgraded rooms,
nd other services which are the responsibility of the per-
on or their family.
.4. Service delivery
Initially, there was concern that an insufﬁcient supply
f service providers would lead to public concerns that the
rograms were offering “insurance without services”. In an
ttempt to stimulate supply growth, the government insti-
uted a provider market with minimum national standards
nd little quality monitoring [5]. Institutional providers are
ccredited by the MOHW and can include both for-proﬁt
nd not-for-proﬁt institutions. Workforce certiﬁcation is
one based on national qualiﬁcations, including 240 h of
raining and practice. However, there is little oversight for
ontinuous quality improvement. This may  change when
t is perceived that an adequate number of providers are
vailable. Providers are paid via different methods depend-
ng on services – per hour for home care, per visit for home
ursing and baths, and per day for institutional care and
ay or evening care.urce: Korean National Health Insurance Service 2014.
2.4.1. Comparing the South Korea approach to Japan and
Germany
Germany and Japan have older populations and more
experience with LTCI and were models for South Korea.
All three countries relied on social insurance systems to
achieve universal coverage through a single national pro-
gram. There are, however, important differences in the
features and implementation of the LTCI programs among
these countries. Middle-income countries will need to
assess the relevance of the difference in their own settings.
3. Long term care insurance in Germany
The German long-term care insurance system was
introduced in 1995 and became fully operational in 1996.
Similar to South Korea, the system is ﬁnanced through
employer and employee contributions. Germany offers
mandatory coverage for long-term disability and illness as
part of the broader national social insurance scheme oper-
ated in 2014 by 131 non-proﬁt Sickness Funds. By using
already established administrative systems, Germany was
able to both create economies of scale in administrative
capacities and also ease the implementation burden.
Compared to South Korea, the long-term care insurance
contribution rate is currently much higher in Germany –
2.05 percent of gross salary, reﬂecting a more generous
beneﬁt package, a higher percentage of older persons in
Germany, and a lower threshold for eligibility. The con-
tribution rate increased steadily from an initial level of 1
percent of gross earnings in January 1995. Employers and
employees in the formal sector split the premium cost.
Retirees pay half of the premium out of pocket and the
pension fund covering the retiree pays the other half, in
contrast to Korea, where there is no special program for
retirees. In Korea, retirees are automatically covered by
LTCI as the dependents of the subscriber or pay their pre-
mium in the same way as the other self-employed.
In Germany, an interesting change is the addition in
2005 of an extra 0.25 percentage points to the LTCI pre-
mium rate for childless individuals, as they are perceived
as being less likely to receive informal care [17]. Health
insurance and social LTCI contributions are calculated as a
percentage of income up to the so-called social insurance
ceiling, which in 2014 was  set at D 48,600. People whose
jobs are not subject to social security, such as self-employed
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individuals, civil servants, and those employed with a wage
income above the social security threshold, are exempted
from social health and LTCI contributions, but are man-
dated to purchase highly regulated private coverage [17].
People born before 1940, as well as persons under 23 years
old, persons in the military and recipients of unemploy-
ment insurance are exempt from paying into the system.
Pensioners used to receive a contribution subsidy from the
pension funds, but since April 2004 have been required to
pay their full LTCI contributions out-of-pocket [18].
Unlike the South Korean system, which has age restric-
tions, German citizens regardless of age are eligible to
receive long-term care beneﬁts. The method for deter-
mining eligibility for beneﬁts is similar to South Korea,
but differs in certain aspects. Physicians and nurses assess
care levels under speciﬁc guidelines, as mandated by the
Medical Review Board. To receive beneﬁts, persons must
have limitations in two ADLs that will persist for at least
6 months and a need for help in some instrumental activi-
ties of daily living (IADLs). In 2007, 30% of applications for
assistance were rejected [19]. The system has three levels
of care needs, similar to the ﬁve grades in South Korea: (1)
need for considerable care, (2) need for intensive care, and
(3) need for highly intensive care. Starting in 2008, there
is also grade 0 for individuals with dementia. According to
the German Federal Ministry of Health, the probability of
being in need of care is 0.7% for persons younger than 60,
4.2% for persons between 60 and 80 years, and increases to
28.8% for persons older than 80 years [20].
Germany makes it much easier to receive cash beneﬁts
than South Korea. In 2011, of the 2.5 million total beneﬁci-
aries receiving long term care beneﬁts, 47.3 percent were
cared for by relatives and other informal caregivers, 23.0
percent were provided services by home care agencies, and
29.7 percent were in institutional care [21,22]. People who
qualify for beneﬁts can choose to receive a cash allowance,
direct services, or a combination of both. Most beneﬁciar-
ies living at home (70.3 percent) choose cash beneﬁts to be
used at the discretion of the beneﬁciary, even though the
value is much lower than that of direct services. Approx-
imately 15 percent of beneﬁciaries living at home receive
both cash and direct services [19].
The German system covers an informal caregiver’s
social security premiums and vacation pay if she/he pro-
vides at least 14 h of care per week, as a way to make
informal care more attractive. The introduction of public
ﬁnancing for LTC at home has led to signiﬁcant growth
in the infrastructure of care giving providers. Since the
inception of the program, the number of home and
community-based providers and institutional care facili-
ties has increased dramatically, from about 4000 home care
agencies in 1995 to 12,349 in 2011, and from 4300 nursing
homes in 1995 to 12,354 in 2011 [21,22]. This expansion
has resulted in virtually no waiting times for institutional
care. The share of private for-proﬁt nursing homes (40 per-
cent) has increased since 1995. In the home-care market,
63 percent of agencies are for-proﬁt, 36 percent are non-
proﬁt and 1 percent are public (Busse and Blumel 2014).
Women  provide the majority of family assistance, and co-
residence with the LTC recipient is very common. Free
voluntary courses providing information and training for19 (2015) 1319–1329
relatives have been available since the introduction of the
program [23].
4. Long term care insurance in Japan
The LTCI system in Japan was implemented in 2000 in
order to provide coverage for long-term care services out-
side of the hospital setting where most of the formal care
was  being provided. Japanese policy makers had eliminated
cost sharing for medical care for the elderly in 1973. Even
though the copayment was reinstated in the early 1980s,
hospitals were frequently being used as long term care
facilities if a family member (traditionally the wife of the
oldest son) was  unable to provide the care. Coupled with
the expansion of hospital supply, this policy led to an inﬂux
of “social admissions” – the number of frail elderly peo-
ple admitted to the hospital without medical justiﬁcation
increased dramatically over several decades and the hos-
pitalization rate in the elderly doubled, from 2 percent in
1970 to 4 percent in 1990 [24]. Length of stay averaged over
30 days, primarily because of these “social admissions”.
This inappropriate use of hospital services was  considered
a serious problem considering the rapid aging of the pop-
ulation and the decreasing number of family caregivers
[25]. Politically, the adoption of the LTCI system is the
result of a decade-long process which began with the intro-
duction of the “Ten Year Strategy to Promote Health and
Welfare for the Elderly”, informally known as the “Gold
Plan”. This ﬁrmly placed the issue of care for the frail elderly
on the public agenda and provided grants to local govern-
ments to signiﬁcantly increase the supply of long-term care
providers according to set targets [25].
Under Japan’s scheme, municipalities act as the insur-
ers for LTCI and are responsible for setting budgets as well
as premium levels for beneﬁciaries. However, ﬁnancing
for LTCI is independent of the municipal budget, in that
the LTCI system can only be ﬁnanced through increases
in premiums and redirection of appropriated funds from
other services is not permitted [24]. Although it opera-
tes as a social insurance system, funding for the LTCI
program is composed of tax revenues (50 percent) and
premiums and copayments from individuals age 40 and
above. Tax revenues are derived from both central and local
taxes (25 percent national, 12.5 percent prefectures, and
12.5 percent municipalities) [26]. Contributions for those
between 40 and 64 years old are set at 0.9 percent of
monthly income. These premiums are collected with the
social health insurance contributions, pooled nationally,
and redistributed according to age and income composi-
tion of municipalities [27]. For those individuals 65 and
older, premiums are set by municipalities (so they vary
geographically depending on local spending) and deducted
by the local government from pension schemes. The pre-
mium rates are revised every three years to maintain ﬁscal
balance, based on each municipality’s cost projections [27].
To receive beneﬁts, individuals must be certiﬁed. Citi-
zens age 65 and older apply at the municipal LTCI ofﬁce
to receive beneﬁts. Eligibility is determined by a combina-
tion of algorithmic analysis using a 79-item form assessed
by a local government employee (usually a public health
nurse) and reviewed by a local expert committee which
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ncludes physicians. There are seven categories of beneﬁts
nd support that differentiate applicants according to their
hysical and mental condition. The review committee can
hange the category determined by the algorithm based on
nformation from the assessor and the attending physician.
bout one ﬁfth of the cases have their categories changed,
sually to a more severe level [24]. In 2007, only 3 per-
ent of applicants for assistance were rejected [19]. After
ligibility and entitlement level have been determined,
ecipients consult with any certiﬁed care management
gency to develop a care plan based on their entitlement
evel and individual preference [24].
When the program was initially put in place, the Gov-
rnment of Japan estimated that 2.7 million people would
e eligible to receive beneﬁts. Of that total number, the
overnment estimated that approximately 0.7 million
ould choose institutional care and the remaining 2 mil-
ion would opt for some form of community care, which
ncludes home care, group homes and other forms of
ssisted living [24]. Initially, these ﬁgures slightly overesti-
ated actual demand, with 2.3 million people certiﬁed as
ligible in the ﬁrst year of LTCI operation. However, the sub-
equent rate of increase was much higher than expected, as
eople became more aware of their entitlement and sup-
ly grew. By 2005, the number of eligible individuals grew
o 4.3 million, or 16 percent of the elderly, while the esti-
ated ﬁgure had been 12 percent [24] (Fig. 3). In 2005, the
ystem’s actual expenditures of ¥6.8 trillion exceeded the
rojected ¥5.5 trillion [24].
Unlike Germany, Japan does not offer cash beneﬁts and
nstead beneﬁt choices are between institutional care and
ome-based or community-based care. Although individ-
als between ages 40 and 64 pay into the system, they are
imited in their access to beneﬁts. Similarly to South Korea,
or people age 40–64 the LTCI system only provides bene-
ts in cases of “age-related” disability such as Alzheimer’s
isease or stroke [28].
Services are divided into two categories: long-term care
eneﬁts and prevention beneﬁts (added in 2006 and play-
ng a secondary role). Long-term care beneﬁts include a
ide range of in-home and institutional beneﬁts, including
ousekeeping and personal care, nurse visits, and rehabil-
tation. The system also covers the costs for leasing and
urchasing speciﬁcally approved assistive devices that aid
eneﬁciaries’ performing of ADLs [27]. All beneﬁts are sub-
ect to a 10 percent coinsurance up to an out-of-pocket
eiling set for each eligibility level. The amount is set irre-
pective of income or assets. After reaching the beneﬁt
eiling, beneﬁciaries pay 100% of their LTC costs out of
ocket until they reach a means-tested stop-loss threshold
alled the “high-cost long-term care service limit”, above
hich insurance covers all services [27]. This is a unique
lement of the Japanese system, which unlike Korea and
ermany provides relatively rich coverage through this
eneﬁt design element for the very high cost patients.
owever, in practice very few beneﬁciaries reach the
top-loss threshold [27]. Unlike Germany, but similarly
o Korea, institutional care beneﬁciaries are responsi-
le for their lodging costs and a portion of meal costs.
hese costs are means-tested and capped for low-income
eople.19 (2015) 1319–1329 1325
Institutional care services include those provided by (i)
special nursing homes, where most beneﬁciaries reside for
the remainder of their lifetime; (ii) long-term care health
facilities, designed for post-discharge rehabilitation and
transition to the community; and (iii) chronic care hospi-
tals. Community-based services were introduced in 2006
and include home visits at night, day care for dementia
patients, dementia group homes, multi-function at-home
care, and care provided in speciﬁc institutions such as pri-
vate nursing homes and long-term welfare institutions. A
large number of beneﬁciaries use day care services [27].
Providers include public, private non-proﬁt, as well as for-
proﬁt organizations (except in institutional care, where
for-proﬁt providers are excluded), licensed and super-
vised by prefectural governments [27]. About 40 percent
of home-care providers are for-proﬁt [29].
Providers are paid using a nationally set fee sched-
ule adjusted every three years, whereby each service is
assigned a number of “units”. This number is constant
across care levels for in-home services, but varies by type
of provider and beneﬁciary care level for institutional
providers. The units are then multiplied by a conversion
factor but can vary based on regional input costs [27].
5. Discussion
Based on the description of the three systems for
long-term care ﬁnancing presented above, middle-income
countries considering LTCI should focus on beneﬁt design,
ﬁnancing, eligibility and supply issues. Middle-income
countries will need to make a number of highly interrelated
decisions that may  take years to consider.
5.1. Beneﬁts design
The most important issue in the design of insurance ben-
eﬁts is their generosity. In this aspect, the three countries’
experiences strongly suggest starting with less generous
beneﬁt packages and expanding the beneﬁts as more ﬁnan-
cing becomes available. The reasons for this approach are
both economic and political. First, less generous beneﬁts
will obviously be easier to ﬁnance, causing a smaller ini-
tial ﬁnancial burden. Moreover, there is usually signiﬁcant
uncertainty in predicting the cost burden of the system
before implementation, as the Japanese case illustrates.
From a political standpoint, this prudent approach will ease
policy makers’ worries of bankrupting the social insurance
and public ﬁnances in the long term, while providing a tan-
gible and valued beneﬁt to the population in the short and
medium term.
Another important issue regarding beneﬁts is whether
to incentivize people to choose institutional services, pro-
fessional home care, informal home care, or cash beneﬁts.
In many countries, elderly people prefer to be cared for at
home and will accept a lower actuarial beneﬁt to be able
to remain at home. The experience of the three countries
suggests that social and cultural norms are key factors in
this context, since there are advantages and disadvantages
to all approaches. Family members, who are considered
more likely to be more knowledgeable and attuned to
beneﬁciaries’ needs and preferences, are provided with
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Table 3
Proportion of elderly population and proportion of eligible population in Germany, Japan, and Korea, 1995-2010.
1995 2000 2008 2010
Germany Population aged 65+ (% of total) 15.5 16.4 20.2 20.4
Eligible persons (% of total) 8.4 13.5 12.9 13.5
Japan Population aged 65+ (% of total) 12.6 17.4 22.0 23.1
Eligible persons (% of total) — 9.9 16.1 16.6
Korea Population aged 65+ (% of total) 5.9 9.2 10.3 10.9
Eligible persons (% of total) — — 4.2 5.8
Sources: Korean National Health Insurance Service (NHIS); Japanese Ministry of Welfare and Labor; German Federal Ministry of Health.
Note: The highlighted cells indicate the relevant proportions in the years when the countries introduced their long-term care insurance programs.
Table 4
Comparison of the Three Systems.
Korea Japan Germany
Financing 50–60% wage
contributions; 0.39% for all
adults registered under
NHI 10–30% central and
local taxes; copayments
½ premiums, ½ taxes; 1/3
of  premium revenue from
65+, with 6 premium levels
based on income; 2/3 from
40 to 64 at 1% of income,
up to a ceiling
Wage contributions; 2.05%
of income up to a ceiling;
2.3% for childless adults
Regional differences in
premium levels
No For those aged 65+, linked
to local spendingFor
40–64, pooled nationally
and redistributed; more
goes to low-income, older
age municipalities
No
Coinsurance 15% for home services20%
for institutional services
10%20% for those with
annual household income
more than $24,000 (from
August 2015)
No coinsurance or
deductible
Population coverage Unconditional for those
aged 65+Conditional for
adults under age 65 with
age-related diseases
(disabled are excluded)
Unconditional for those
aged 65+Limited to
age-related diseases for
those aged 40–64
All ages
Percentage of those aged
65+ eligible
4.2% in 20086.1% in 2013 16.5% in 200818.2% in 2013 12.0% in 2011
Percentage of those aged
65+ receiving beneﬁts
3.1% in 20085.2% in 2013 13.3% in 200814.9% in 2013 12.0% in 2011
Eligibility levels 5 5 for regular LTCI2 for
preventive beneﬁts
3 (plus a limited additional
hardship level in HCBS)
Beneﬁt ceilings per month
($ PPP)
Home care:
$1,015-$1,318Institutional
services:
$1,298-$1,824Cash
allowance (only in
exceptional cases): $173
Services onlyHCBS:
$1,670-$3,610HCBS
preventive care:
$500-$1050Institutional
services:
$1990-$3960Room/board
costs covered for
low-income; 1/3 covered
for all other beneﬁciaries
Cash:
$297–$886 + caregiver
pension premiumsHCBS:
$570–1899 (hardship:
$2260)Institutional
services:
$1295–1962Room/board
costs not covered;
low-income covered under
public assistance
Management National Health Insurance
Service, central and local
branches (LTC managed
separately)
LTC insurance section of
municipal government or
their coalitions
Sickness Funds (LTC
managed separately)
Fee  schedule for services Set nationally by NHIS Negotiated nationally,
adjusted for regional cost
differences
Negotiated regionally
between sickness funds
and providers
GDP/capita when started
system (US$ PPP)
28,718 25,931 22,464
GDP/capita in 2013 (US$
PPP)
33,140 36,315 43,332
Time  to set up system 10 years 5 years 4 years
Sources: Government publications on long-term care insurance, as cited in text.
Notes: Converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) using OECD published conversion rates; GDP = gross domestic product; HCBS = home care beneﬁts and
services.
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ash beneﬁts in Germany to encourage informal care giv-
ng. These payments have been about half of the value of
ervice-only beneﬁts, thus helping the German system con-
ain costs. In Japan, the opposite is the case: cash beneﬁts
re not provided at all, due to the concern that informal
aregivers (generally young wives) would be burdened.
oreover, Japan’s long experience with institutionalizing
he elderly in hospitals during the pre-LTCI period made
ormal care giving more acceptable in the Japanese culture
Tables 3 and 4).
The main concern in Japan was providing insurance
ithout beneﬁts, so payments and beneﬁts were designed
o encourage provider entry in the market. This included
or-proﬁt providers, which is the ﬁrst time a Japanese
ocial services sector was opened to for-proﬁt ﬁrms. As
osts escalated rapidly, in 2005–2006, the Government
ntroduced preventive services for levels 1 and 2 (consid-
red “at risk” groups) as a way to discourage nursing home
lacement. These services include strength training, nutri-
ion management, and education, and their goal is to help
eniors maintain or enhance the ability to perform ADL
nd prevent them from becoming dependent [26]. These
eforms were part of a larger strategy to reduce institu-
ionalization and contain costs; another policy choice was
o introduce 50 percent copayments for lodging charges
n institutional settings (low-income elders are exempt)
26].
In Korea, cash beneﬁts are provided only in regions
here institutional providers are not available. Another
oncern, raised by women’s groups, was that provid-
ng cash beneﬁts would increase the burden on family
aregivers, particularly women, while hampering their
orkforce participation. Finally, there was a fear that pro-
iding cash beneﬁts would keep the facility infrastructure
nderdeveloped [5].
.2. Financing
Middle-income countries face difﬁcult choices among
ifferent ﬁnancing sources for long-term care beneﬁts:
rivate insurance, social insurance, or general tax-based
ystems. Private insurance may  be the least desirable
ption for most middle-income countries because of sig-
iﬁcant insurance market failures on the supply side
ound in many high-income countries. Long-term care
nsurance markets tend to exhibit higher than actuarially
air premiums with very limited beneﬁts, with numerous
xclusions and typically cover only about one third of total
ifetime expenditure risk [30].
Revenue raised from general taxes provides a more
rogressive source of funding as well as potentially
ore ﬂexibility in allocating resources among different
overnment priorities. However, countries with general
evenue-ﬁnanced systems controlled by local governments
ay  ﬁnd it difﬁcult to enforce national standards for eligi-
ility. Moreover, these systems are much more vulnerable
o budget cuts as priorities shift because of both political
nd economic factors. But ultimately, as we have seen in
he cases of Korea, Japan, and Germany, countries famil-
ar with social insurance will likely favor this mechanism
or LTCI, while those having experience with tax-funded19 (2015) 1319–1329 1327
systems are more prone to favor this approach for funding
long term care as well.
Social insurance as a mechanism for ﬁnancing long-
term care has a number of advantages for middle-income
countries. First, the countries are familiar with the system
since it is commonly used to ﬁnance medical care and the
infrastructure is already in place. Second, earmarking the
funds for speciﬁc beneﬁts increases the political feasibility
of introducing such a scheme. Third, separating the funds
from the larger government budget means that LTC ﬁnan-
cing does not compete directly with other priorities such
as the military, education, infrastructure investment, etc.
But even when employing social insurance as the basic
approach, the three countries use a variety of approaches
to supplement social insurance contributions. First, social
contributions are covered for the unemployed, students,
and those with low incomes through tax revenues as a way
to increase the equity in the system. These revenues can
be ﬁnanced either through local taxes or general revenues
depending on countries’ local government administrative
and ﬁscal capacity. Second, out-of-pocket payments are
often utilized as an essential tool to curb moral hazard and
prevent overutilization of services, as seen in the cases of
Korea and Japan. These payments are commonly waived
for low-income beneﬁciaries and the foregone revenue is
recovered from taxes. Germany, in contrast, does not have
any cost sharing. There may  be a need for a catastrophic cap
on out of pocket spending and Japan’s approach of institut-
ing a stop-loss threshold is one approach.
5.3. Eligibility and coverage assessment
Coverage policy has critical implications for the func-
tioning and costs of the system. A key question is whether
coverage is restricted to older people only or extended to
include younger disabled persons as well. In Korea, only the
aged are covered. In contrast, in Germany all individuals are
eligible to receive beneﬁts; this is a key tenet of the German
principle of social solidarity – everyone pays and every-
one is eligible for beneﬁts in case of need. Japan adopted
both approaches – covering only people age 40–64 years
who have speciﬁc diseases. These examples highlight the
spectrum of choice available for middle-income countries.
Another choice pertains to the process of determining
coverage. As mentioned, the German system administers
an objective assessment tool, while Korea and Japan uses
both an assessment tool as well as medical review by an
expert committee to determine who receives beneﬁts. The
German system has the advantage that it is more objective,
but that depends on the public’s perception of the legit-
imacy of a “bureaucratic” algorithm. In Japan and Korea,
where the medical profession lobbied politically to gain a
role in the assessment process, doctors gained a critical role
in the system.
5.4. Provider supply and qualityA concern is that the introduction of LTCI may  not guar-
antee appropriate care if the country faces a shortage of
providers, as is often the case in many middle-income
countries. LTCI can serve as a stimulus for the development
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of service providers, since the predictability of funding cre-
ates more stable market conditions. Governments, worried
about insufﬁcient providers, should consider allowing a
“preparation” phase before the passage of LTCI legislation,
in which formal caregivers can be trained and a function-
ing provider market can be created. At the beginning, one
possibility is to ﬁnance coverage at more stringent levels
through tax revenues, typically through existing welfare
systems. Japan’s Gold Plan and New Gold Plan, for exam-
ple, provided grants to local governments, but kept the
means-tested beneﬁts under the control of local welfare
departments [24]. The targets of these programs were suc-
cessfully met, and they provided time for the number of
providers to increase. In contrast, Korea did little to develop
its public LTC infrastructure before the introduction of LTCI
[8] and as a result, there were initial problems with imple-
mentation.
Even when overall supply levels are satisfactory, there
may  be substantial variation in the availability of providers
across different areas – including a complete lack of
providers in some geographic areas. Korea’s solution to
this issue has been to provide cash beneﬁts for informal
caregivers in locations in which there is a lack of formal
providers in a certain region. Finally, Germany’s goal was  to
strengthen the incentives for home care by providing cash
beneﬁts and free LTC training courses, as well as paying
statutory pension insurance for informal caregivers who
provide more than 14 h of nursing per week [31].
A related question is how governments can ensure
appropriate levels of service quality. This is especially
important in the early years when there is a need to expand
capacity and becomes a problem later when some low
quality institutions are in place. Attempting to stimulate
providers’ market entry in the initial years creates the
danger of accrediting low-quality providers, thus creating
a trade-off between service availability and quality. One
mechanism for promoting quality beyond initial accred-
itation is to allow free provider choice (and switching
providers) by beneﬁciaries. However, real choice requires
a sufﬁcient number of providers in the market, as well
as substantial and accessible information on quality and
prices. These elements may  not be present in a developing
market, which is why strong government oversight may
be warranted, particularly through continuous monitor-
ing and quality assurance. This requires more signiﬁcant
investments in government capacity and the development
of sound quality standards and assessment procedures. The
standards can be strengthened even more once policy mak-
ers judge that there are sufﬁcient providers.
5.5. Economic development and LTCI
Middle-income countries may  be worried about
whether LCTI will hamper economic growth. In fact, there
may be two major ways in which LTCI can positively affect
growth. First, a beneﬁt design encouraging formal care as
opposed to informal care can contribute to increasing labor
participation. It provides jobs and it allows women to work
instead of caring for their parents or parents in law. Sec-
ond, a well-designed LTCI system may  promote a more
efﬁcient allocation of resources for taking care of the aged
[
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population. In the absence of such a system, the LTC
provider market may  suffer from adverse selection result-
ing in high prices and inability to get care [30]. Moreover,
the lack of sufﬁcient providers and ﬁnancing may  strain
the cohesion of young families, affecting their economic
productivity.
6. Conclusion
In summary, the experiences of South Korea, Germany,
and Japan provide valuable lessons for middle-income
countries considering insurance for long-term care. Long-
term care beneﬁts can lead to high public satisfaction if
properly designed, and a highly functional system can be
implemented with a variety of beneﬁt designs that ﬁt
policy-makers’ goals and the ﬁscal and economic situation
of the country. In particular, a high level of public satisfac-
tion is possible even with relatively modest beneﬁts. One
major choice is whether to allow cash beneﬁts. The most
important elements affecting the cost of the system are
beneﬁts design and eligibility criteria. Another key issue
is service quality, which can be encouraged through var-
ious mechanisms of market competition and regulation.
Finally, LTCI systems can boost economic growth by free-
ing up informal caregivers for labor market participation
and promoting social cohesion. Middle-income countries
must begin these preparations long before the program is
implemented.
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